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Abstract— 
In general information aggregation design that reduces a large amount of transmission is the most practical technique. In 
previous studies, homomorphic encryptions have been applied to conceal communication during aggregation such that 
enciphered data can be aggregated algebraically without decryption. Since aggregators collect data without decryption, 
adversaries are not able to forge aggregated results by compromising them. However, these schemes are not satisfy 
multi-application environments. Second, these schemes become insecure in case some sensor nodes are compromised. 
Third, these schemes do not provide secure counting; thus, they may suffer unauthorized aggregation attacks. Therefore, 
we propose a new concealed data aggregation scheme extended from Boneh et al.‟s homomorphic public encryption 
system. The proposed scheme has three contributions. First, it is designed for a multi-application environment. The base 
station extracts application-specific data from aggregated cipher texts. Next, it mitigates the impact of compromising 
attacks in single application environments. Finally, it degrades the damage from unauthorized aggregations. To prove the 
proposed scheme‟s robustness and efficiency, we also conducted the comprehensive analyses and comparisons in the 
end. 
Index Terms—Concealed data aggregation; elliptic curve cryptography; homomorphic encryption; wireless sensor 
networks. 
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1    INTRODUCTION 
WIRELESS sensor networks (WSNs) consist of thousands of sensor nodes (SN) that gather data from deployed 
environments.  Currently,  there are  plenty  of  rich  applications proposed for WSNs, such as environment monitoring, 
accident reporting, and military investigation [1]. Depending on  the  purpose  of  each  application,  SN  are  customized  
to read  different  kinds  of  data  (e.g.,  temperature,  light,  or smoke). Typically, SN are restricted by the resources due to 
limited   computational   power   and   low   battery   supply; thus, energy saving technologies must be considered when 
we design the protocols.  For better energy utilization, cluster-based WSNs [2] have been proposed. In cluster-based 
WSNs,  SN  resident  in  nearby  area  would  form  a  cluster and select one among them to be their cluster head (CH ). 
Although data aggregation could significantly reduce transmission, it is vulnerable to some attacks. For instance, 
compromising   a   CH   will   allow   adversaries   to   forge aggregated results [4] as similar as compromising all its cluster 
members. The decrypted aggregated result will be incorrect. The only solution is to aggregate the cipher texts of   different   
applications   separately.   As   a   result,   the transmission cost grows as the number of the applications increases.   By   
CDAMA,   the   cipher texts   from   different applications can be encapsulated into “only” one cipher text. Conversely, the 
base station can extract application-specific plaintexts via the corresponding secret keys. CDAMA mitigates the impact of 
compromising SN through the construction of multiple groups. An adversary can forge data  only  in  the  compromised  
groups,  not  the whole system. 
2    SYSTEM MODEL 
Here,  we  state  two  models  for  further  uses,  aggregation model  and  attack  model.  The  aggregation  model  defines 
how  aggregation  works;  the  attack  model  defines  what kinds  of  attacks  a  secure  data  aggregation  scheme  
should protect from. 
2.1 Aggregation Model 
In  WSNs,  SN  collect  information  from  deployed  environments and forward the information back to base 
station (BS) via  multihop  transmission  based  on  a  tree  or  a  cluster topology.   The   accumulated   transmission   
carries   large energy cost for intermediate nodes. To increase the lifetime, tree-based or cluster networks force the 
intermediate nodes 
(a sub tree node or a cluster head) to perform aggregation, i.e.,  to  be  aggregators  (AG).  
2.2 Attack Model 
First of all, we categorize the adversary‟s abilities as follows: 
1. Adversaries can  eavesdrop  on  transmission  data  in a  WSN. 
2. Adversaries can send forged data to any entities in a 
WSN (e.g., SN , AG, or BS). 
3. Adversaries can compromise secrets in SN s or AGs through capturing them. 
Second,  we  define  the  following  attacks  to  qualify  the security  strength  of  a  CDA  scheme.  Part  of  these  
attacks refer  to  Peter  et  al.‟s  analysis  [15].  Based  on  adversary‟s abilities and purposes, we further classify these 
attacks into three categories. 
3    PRELIMINARIES 
3.1 Privacy Homomorphic Cryptosystem 
Privacy homomorphic  encryption  (PH)  is  an  encryption scheme  with  homomorphic  property.  The  
homomorphic property implies that algebraic operations on plaintexts can be executed by manipulating the corresponding 
cipher texts; 
EK ð Þ is the encryption with key K, DK ð Þ is the decryption with key K, and and denote operations on cipher 
texts and plaintexts, respectively. In general, operations and can be addition, multiplication, and so on.Similar to 
conventional encryption schemes, PH schemes are classified to symmetric cryptosystem when the encryption and   
decryption   keys   are   identical,   or   asymmetric cryptosystem (also called public key cryptosystem) when the two keys 
are different. Symmetric PH schemes, such as Domingo-Ferrer scheme [17] or Castelluccia et al.‟s scheme, usually are 
more competitive in  terms  of  efficiency  than asymmetric  schemes.  The  most  notable  asymmetric  PH schemes  are  
based  on  elliptic  curve  cryptography  (ECC). Compared   with   RSA   cryptosystems,   ECC   provides   the same   
security   with   a   shorter   key   size   and   shorter cipher texts. A 160-bit ECC cryptosystem provides the same security  
as  a  1,024-bit  RSA  cryptosystem  [5].  In  energy- constraint WSNs, constructing PH via ECC is more efficient. Up to 
now, the PH schemes on ECC include elliptic curve Okamoto-Uchiyama   (EC-OU),   elliptic   curve   Naccache- Stern,  
elliptic  curve  Paillier,  and  elliptic  curve  ElGamal Encryption Schemes (EC-EG) [2]. 
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3.2 CDA Based on PH 
Conventional hop-by-hop aggregation schemes are insecure because  an  adversary  is  able  to  forge  
aggregated  results such  as  compromising  all  the  AG‟s  child  nodes  when  he compromises the secret of an AG. To 
diminish this impact, PH schemes have been applied to WSNs [9], [10], [2], [12],[14].  By  PH  schemes,  SN s  encrypt  
their  sensed  readings and   allow   AGs   to   homomorphically   aggregate   their cipher texts  without  decryption.  
Therefore, compromising AGs earns no advantage of forging aggregated results. West off  et  al.  [9]  and  Girao  et  al.  
[10]  proposed  CDA based  on  symmetric  PH  to  facilitate  the  aggregation  of encrypted  data.  In contrast  to  
symmetric  PH  construction, Mykletun   et   al.   [2]   adopted   public-key-based   PH   to construct  their  systems,  and  
Girao  et  al.  [12]  extended  the ElGamal   PH   encryption   to   construct   an   aggregation scheme.  In  these  schemes,  
because  all  SN  in  a  network only share a common key for encryption [9], [10], [2], [12], an  adversary  can  forge  the  
aggregated  results  by  simply compromising one SN 
(PRNG)   and  adds   its  messages  with  the   key  under   modulation.  The  AG  aggregates  those  cipher texts  through 
modular  addition.  And  the  BS   decrypts  the  cipher text received by modular subtraction with all the temporal keys.If  
an  adversary  tries  to  forge  aggregated  results,  he  must compromise   all   SN s.   However,   their   scheme   cannot 
prevent  the  adversary  from  injecting  forged  data  packets into the legitimate data flow. In addition, key synchronization 
must be guaranteed because each SN  must rekey after each encryption. 
BGN   provides   additive   and   multiplicative homomorphism.  Since  the  multiplicative  property,  based on   the   
bilinear   pairing   [13],   is   much   expensive   and inefficient   for   SN s   [21],   we   only   utilize   the   additive 
homomorphism  of  BGN.  In  this  paper,  we  first  provide  a possible  application  for  BGN,  data  aggregation.  Further- 
more, we  modify  BGN  to  fit  multigroup  construction  for stronger security and better applicability in CDA. 
BGN  is  constructed  on  a  cyclic  group  of  elliptic  curve points.  Precisely,  these  points  form  an  algebraic  
group, where the identity element of the group is the infinite point, 
1  [22].  Notation  ord(P )  denotes  the  order  of  a  point  P . Supposing  ord(P )  ¼ q,  it  indicates  that  q  is  the  
minimum integer  that  satisfies  q P  ¼ 1.  In  the  KEYGEN  function, the order of E  is equivalent to the number of 
points in E. The detail construction of E is depicted in Section 6.3. 
The ENC function is based on point addition and scalar multiplication over  points  G  and  H.  As  we  can  see,  the cipher 
text is composed of the message part (the scalar of the point G) and the secure randomness (the scalar of the point H).  
Due  to  homomorphic  properties,  the  AGG  function aggregates cipher texts via point addition; it is trivial to see that  the  
scalar  values  of  point  G  were  added  in  the  end, yielding  the  sum  of  the  corresponding  message.  Conse- quently, 
the final result will be the form of M  Gþ R  H, where M is the sum of the messages and R is the sum of the randomness.  
The  DEC  function  decrypts  the  aggregated result to obtain the plaintext value, M . Recall that the order of  points  G  
and  H  are  different.   
4 CDAMA  
BGN is implemented by using two points of different orders so   that   the   effect   of   one   point   can   be   removed   by 
multiplying  the  aggregated  cipher text  with  the  order  of the  point,  and  then  the  scalar  of  the  other  point  can  be 
obtained.  Based  on  the  same  logic  of  BGN,  CDAMA  is designed  by  using   multiple  points,   each  of  which   has 
different  order.  We  can  obtain  one  scalar  of  the  specific point through removing the effects of remaining points (i.e., 
multiplying  the  aggregated  cipher text  with  the  product  of the   orders   of   the   remaining   points).   The   security   of 
CDAMA  and  BGN  are  based  on  the  hardness  assumption of  subgroup  decision  problem,  whereas  CDAMA  
requires more   precise   secure   analysis   for   parameter   selections, discussing in Section 6.2. We use CDAMA (k ¼ 2) 
to explain how it works in multiple groups. 
4.1 CDAMA (k ¼ 2) Construction 
Assume that all SN s are divided into two groups, GA  and GB .  CDAMA contains  four  procedures:  Key  generation, 
encryption, aggregation, and decryption, listing in Fig. 2. As we can see, CDAMA (k ¼ 2) is implemented by using three 
points   P; Q,  and   H   whose   orders   are   q1 ;q2 ,  and   q3 , respectively can be aggregated   to   a   single   cipher 
text,   but   the   aggregated.  Now,  the  cipher text  contains  only  the  product  of  G  (i.e.,  ordðHÞ    M  G) such that we 
can apply the discrete logarithm to retrieve the value  M .   In  fact,   discrete  logarithm   canp  be   solved  by Pollard‟s
 method whose efficiency is Oð   ffiffiffiffiT Þ. 
Now, we use a brief instance to explain how BGN works in  CDA.  When  sensor  S1   gets  its  sensed  reading  M1 ,  
S1 performs the ENC function to encrypt M1  as cipher text C1 . After  that,  S1   sends  C1   to  its  aggregator  AG.  Once  
AG received  all  cipher texts  fC1 ; ... ;C  g  from  its  child  nodes, fS1 ; ... ;S  g, the AG aggregates C1  to C   through 
executing recursive  ( 1)  AGG  operations  on  all  cipher texts  re- ceived,  e.g.,  AGG( AGG(AGG(C1 ;C2 Þ;C3 Þ C  ).  
Then, AG sends the  aggregated  result  to  the  next  aggregator. message  of  each  group  can  be  obtained  by  
decrypting  the cipher text with the corresponding SK. 
Considering  deployment,  the  private  keys  should  be kept  secret  and  only  known  by  the  BS.  SN s  in  the  
same group  share  the  same  public  key  and  no  other  entities outside  the  group  knows  the  group  public  key.  
How  to securely deliver the public keys to different groups of SN s will be discussed later in Section 4.4. Another major 
change is   the   decryption   procedure.   By   performing   individual decryption, the BS extracts individual aggregated 
results of different groups from an aggregated cipher text. 
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4.2 A Concrete Example 
Now, we use an instance to describe how CDAMA (k ¼ 2) works. In Fig. 3, a WSN consists of six SN s and four AGs. 
After   deployments,   they   form   three   clusters.   Each   SN belongs   to   either   application   A   or   B.   Without   
loss   of generality,  sensors  A1 ,  A2 ,  and  A3   perform  application  A and keep the public key PKA  ¼ ðn; E; P; H;TA 
Þ. The others, B1 , B2 , and B3  keep PKB  ¼ ðn; E; Q; H;TB Þ. Four aggregators,  AG1   to  AG4   are  deployed  to  
gather  messages  from their child nodes. To simplify the example, we set the order of  P,  Q,  and  H  to  small  numbers.  
We assume  that  jq1 j ¼ jq2 j ¼ jq3 j ¼ 10,   e.g.,   ord(P)   ¼ q1  ¼ 521,   ord(Q)   ¼ q2  ¼ 
523,ord   ( H)   ¼ q3  ¼ 541,   a n d   n ¼ q1 q2 q3  ¼ 147; 413; 303, where  jqi j  is  the  bit  size  of  qi .  Moreover,  we  
assume  T  ¼ 
128 and x ¼ 3 such that the maximal sensed value in both applications is at most 42 (i.e., TA  ¼ TB  ¼ 42). 
We  assume  the  messages  of  these  sensors  are  MA1   ¼ 
13;MA2 ¼ 21,  MA3   ¼ 10,  MB1   ¼ 32,  MB2   ¼ 17,  and  MB3   ¼ 
24.  They  are  encrypted  to  the  corresponding  cipher texts. After  the  aggregation  by  the  AGs,  the  BS  receives  
the final  aggregated  result  AR4   whose  value  is  36P þ  73Qþ  
195;   121; 825H ¼ 36P þ 73Qþ 477; 385; 22H.   The   aggre-   gated  result  in  application  A,  MA  ¼ M1  þ M2  þ M3  ¼ 
36 can  be  obtained  by  decrypting  AR4    using  SKA    in  the following  steps: 
4.3 Generalization of CDAMA 
CDAMA (k ¼ 2) can be generalized to CDAMA (k > 2). The paradigm of generalization uses different generators to 
construct different key pairs for groups. For security reasons, the order of E should be large enough. Therefore, when k 
becomes large, the length of cipher text will also expand. The analysis on this overhead is stated in Section 6.2. For multi-
application WSNs, the SNs belonging to one specific application are assigned the same group public key. Under CDAMA, 
the cipher texts from different applications can be aggregated together, but they are not mixed. The ciphertexts can be 
integrated into a ciphertext and transmitted to the BS. The BS then individually decrypts the aggregated ciphertext to 
extract the aggregated value of each application. 
4.4 Key Distribution 
In the end of this section, we briefly address how to deliver the group public keys to SNs securely. There are two main 
approaches. 
Conventional Aggregation Model with Multiple Groups 
Interestingly, applying CDAMA to the conventional aggregation model can mitigate the impact  from  compromising 
attacks. Fig. 6 shows an example of this case. In Fig. 6, all SN s  are  in  the  same  application,  e.g.,  fire  alarm,  but  
they can   be   arranged   into   two   groups   through   CDAMA construction. Each group could be assigned a distinct 
group public key. Once an adversary compromised a SN in group A;  it  only  reveals  PKA ,  not  PKB .  Since  the  
adversary  can only  forge  messages in  group  A, not  group  B,  the  SN s in  group B can still communicate safely. The 
ideal case is that CDAMA assigns every node for its own group, resulting in the strongest security CDAMA ever offered. 
However, this is   impractical   because   the   size   of   cipher text   becomes extremely  large  when  we  construct  
groups  with  a  huge group  number. 
5   DISCUSSION 
In   this   section,   we   discuss   several   issues   in   CDAMA, including  efficient  implementation,  cipher text  length,  
and curve selection. The first is efficient computation. Since a lot of operations in CDAMA are based on scalar 
multiplication on   elliptic   curve   points,   skills   which   accelerate   scalar multiplications  can  enhance  the  
performance  of  CDAMA. 
5.1 Efficient Scalar Multiplication 
In  CDAMA,  the  efficiency  of  encryption  and  decryption depends  on  the  performance  of  scalar 
multiplication  on elliptic curves. Decryption is not considered here because a BS  is  considering  as  powerful  as  a  
workstation.  Given  a random  elliptic  point  P,  we  calculate  k  P  with  a  given integer   k   by   scalar   multiplication.    
5.2 Size of Cipher texts 
Size  of  cipher texts  is  another  metric  for  performance  and cost  evaluation.  In  CDAMA,  the  cipher text  is  stored  
as  a couple  of  elliptic  curve  affine  points.  If  the  finite  field  of elliptic  curve  is  F p ,  the  size  of  cipher text  is  jpjþ 1  
bits because we only store the x-coordinates of curve points and the  additional  one  bit  for  the  sign  of  y-coordinate.  
On  the other  hand,  CDAMA  requires  specific  curves  of  the  given order. If we construct a curve with a given order, 
how can we estimate the bit length of the finite field, i.e., jpj in F p ? Based  on  Theorem  1,  the  size  of  finite  field  of  a  
curve  is 
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5.3 Generating Suitable Curves 
The main challenge of constructing CDAMA is generating the   set   of   elliptic   curve   points   with   a   given   
order(generating the curves with given orders). The BGN scheme adopts  pairing-friendly  curves  (also  called  super  
singular curves) to construct their scheme because bilinear pairing is necessary  under  their  construction  [33].However,  
these curves  do  not  have  computational  efficiency  because  the length of the underlying field doubles; if the given 
order is k-bit long, the underlying prime field requires 2k bits. In  CDAMA,  we  select  different  approach  because  bi- 
linear pairing is no longer required and length of the prime field  doubles  based  on  the  given  order  in  pairing-friendly 
curves.   To   find   suitable   curves   in   CDAMA,   we   select Bro¨ ker‟s   [34]   approaches   to   generate   desired   
curves. 
6    SECURITY  ANALYSIS AND  COMPARISON 
In  this  section,  we  analyze  the  security  of  CDAMA  and other conventional schemes. More specifically, we compare 
CDAMA  with  four  well-known  CDA  schemes:  CDA  [9], 
[10],  Castelluccia  et  al.‟s  scheme  [14],  Mykletun  et  al.‟s scheme   [2],   and   TinyPEDS   [12].   In   Mykletun   et   al.‟s 
scheme,  the  authors  applied  several  well-known  public key   PH   schemes   to   WSNs.   They   recommended   two 
schemes  which  are  suitable  for  WSNs,  EC-OU  and  EC- EG. Since TinyPEDS [12] is the same as the EC-EG scheme 
[2],  we  chose  TinyPEDS  as  a  candidate.  In  addition  to these   four   schemes,   BGN—from   which   our   proposed 
CDAMA   is   extended—is   also   analyzed.   Consequently, we  analyze  CDA,  Castelluccia  et  al.‟s  scheme,  
TinyPEDS, EC-OU,  BGN,  and  CDAMA  based  on  the  attack  model defined  in  Section  2.2. A1. Ciphertext only 
attack. All schemes can defend against this basic attack. 
7   PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND COMPARISON 
7.1 Candidate Schemes for Comparison 
We   only   compare   the   performance   of   CDAMA   with TinyPEDS [12] and EC-OU [2] because CDA [9], [10] and 
Castelluccia   et   al.‟s   scheme   [14]   are   both   symmetric schemes;  therefore,  they  are  not  suitable  to  compare  
with asymmetric  schemes.  In  general,  symmetric  schemes  are more   efficient   but   less   secure   than   asymmetric   
ones. The  security  properties  of  CDA  and  Castelluccia  et  al.‟s scheme have been verified in the previous section. To 
make the   comparison   comprehensive,   BGN   is   also   covered. Consequently,  we  chose  EC-OU  over  F p   (jpj ¼ 
1; 024-bit), TinyPEDS   over   F p    (jpj ¼ 163-bit),   BGN   over   F p    (jpj ¼  
1; 024), and CDAMA (k ¼ 2 4) over F p  (jpj ¼ 768;  1; 024, and 1,280) as candidates. 
7.2 Evaluation Measurements 
For  evaluating  these  schemes,  three  terms  1,  2,  and  3  are defined.  The  first  two  terms  are  used  in  measuring  
the computation cost, including the encryption cost on SN s and aggregation cost on AGs. The decryption cost on a BS is 
not measured  because  BSs  are  always  as  powerful  as  work- stations.  The  final  term  3  is  the  communication  
cost  per application: 
1. The encryption cost on SN . The computation cost of encryptions. The unit is mJ/per encryption. 
2. The  aggregation  cost  on  AG.  The  computation  cost of aggregations. The unit is mJ/per aggregation. 
3. The   communication   cost   per   applications.   The cipher text size required by an application. The unit is bits/per 
application. 
7.3 Evaluation Results 
To  analyze  the  computation  cost,  the  same  metric  for  all schemes  is  required.  Since  TinyPEDS,  EC-OU,  BGN,  
and CDAMA  are  all  built  on  elliptic  curves,  encryption  and aggregation   are   based   on   two   kinds   of   operations, 
point  addition  and  point  scalar  multiplication.  In  elliptic curve  arithmetic,  two  basic  operations  are  point  doubling 
and adding. A point adding is computing P þ Q, where P and  Q  are  curve  points.  Point  doubling  is  computing  2P. 
Scalar  multiplication  is  to  compute  r  Q,  where  r  is  a scalar.   Based   on   point   adding   and   doubling,   scalar 
multiplication  is  accomplished  by  the  half-and-add  algo- rithm   [36].   More   specifically,   computing   r  Q   requires 
7.4 Performance Gain of CDAMA 
In  the  above  analysis,  the  computation  cost  of  CDAMA  is significantly  large.  Although  data  aggregation  can  
reduce the  communication  effectively,  sensors  must  pay  higher computation cost for encryption and aggregation. To 
argue with this point, we estimate the performance gain from the whole WSN based on CDAMA.First  of  all,  we  classify  
sensors  in  large  scale  WSNs  to three types by their tasks: Leaf nodes, AGs, and forwarders 
Leaf nodes are leaves of a formed topology (e.g., a tree); they gather information from the deployed environment and send 
the result back the BS via other nodes. AGs are the intermediate nodes in the topology, such as parent nodes   or   cluster   
heads;   they   aggregate   the   forwarded messages if possible. Forwarders are the nodes on the path to  the  BS;  their  
main  task  is  to  forward  the  aggregated result to the BS without aggregation. Next, we estimate the energy 
consumption on different nodes. 
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We compare CDAMA (k ¼ 2) with a WSN without data aggregation (also called Data Forwarding Scheme, DFS). In 
DFS, a leaf node encrypts its sensed reading by symmetric encryption schemes (e.g., AES) and forwards the cipher text to  
its  parent  AG.  AGs  and  forwarders  just  transmit  the received  data   without  any  in-network   processing.  Both 
schemes (rather than hop-by-hop aggregation) provide end- to-end security, thereby avoiding the forgery of aggregated 
result. The result is shown in Table 3. We assume that CT and  CR   are  the  cost  of  receiving  one  bit  and  transmitting 
1  bit,  respectively.  C1E   is  the  cost  of  AES  encryption,  and C2E    and   C2A    are   the   cost   of   CDAMA   
encryption   and aggregation,  respectively.  „1   and  „2   are  the  bit  length  of  a cipher text   of   AES   and  CDAMA,   
respectively. Moreover,   we   evaluate   the   result   in   Table   3   by substituting   variables   with   practical   values.   
That   is   to say,  we  use  the  estimated  results  of  energy  consumption on  MICAz  and  TelosB  in  [38]  to  analyze  
the  performance gain. The results are shown in Table 4. We assume that the deployed topology  is  a  three-layer  cluster. 
8    CONCLUSION 
For a  multi-application  environment,  CDAMA  is  the  first distinct applications can be aggregated, but not mixed. For a 
single-application environment, CDAMA is still more secure   than   other   CDA   schemes.   When   compromising attacks 
occur in WSNs, CDAMA mitigates the impact and reduces the damage to an acceptable condition. 
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